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The Constitutionality of the Ohio
Arbitration Act
By ROBERT E. LEACH
The Ohio Arbitration Act G. C. 12148-I to 17, 114 O.L.
137, went into effect July 28, 1931. In order to discuss to
any extent the constitutionality of the act a bit of history of the
relation of courts to arbitration is necessary. The exact pro-
visions of the Ohio Act will be given later. It suffices here to
state merely that it provides for the irrevocability of contracts
to arbitrate future disputes and for the enforcement of such
contracts by specific performance.
It is an elementary proposition of the common law that "fu-
ture disputes," clauses, and provisions for arbitration are revoc-
able. Meacham v. Jameston, 211 N.Y. 346, 105 N.E. 655,
Ann. Cas. 1915 C, 851 (1914) Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., 19o
Cal. 665, 214 Pac. 38, 26 A.L.R. 1070 (1923); Henry v. Le-
heigh Valley Coal Co., 6I Cal. App. 182, 215 Pac. 448 (19o6).
These rules are said to date back to Vynior's Case decided by
Lord Coke in 16o9. Coke's Reports Part VIII, p. 8o, 8 Co.
803, 816 (16o9).
"One bound to an award to stand,
Well the authority may countermand."
Worrel, Reports of Lord Coke in verse, 1742. (Speaking of
Vynior's Case.) The case is important for the dicta "if I submit
myself to arbitratiment-yet I may revoke it, for my act or my
words cannot alter the judgment of the law to make the irre-
vocable "which is of its own nature revocable." Since in this
case recovery on the bond was sued for and obtained surely
Vynior's Case did not take an unfavorable view of arbitration.
Later cases taking such a view have been based on the dicta of
this case however.
Soon afterward the courts refused to allow more than nom-
inal damages for breach of a contract to arbitrate, even under
seal. The theory of the courts was that the plaintiff must show
actual damage and that no actual damage was incurred by such
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a breach since to force the parties into the courts could injure no
one. Thus the right of a party to breach with impunity con-
tracts to submit to arbitration was recognized but the basis for
such decisions was not that of revocation of agency, the principle
invoked in the dicta in Vynior's Case but the theory that to
hold otherwise would "oust the jurisdiction of the courts."
This phrase had not appeared in any of the earlier cases.
It is first seen in Kill v. Hollister, I Wils. 129 (1749). The
doctrine of "ousting the jurisdiction of the courts" can be traced
indirectly to the Statute of Fines and Penalties, 9 William III
(1687), at least in the case of contracts under seal, since this
statute allowed the court to go behind the bond and award to
that praintiff the amount which he was actually damaged.
Statutes concerning arbitration were passed in England in 1698,
1833, 1854, 1889, and 1934 but in none was any distinction
made between the submission of an existing dispute and any
future disptes that might arise under the contract. See Sayre:
"Development of the Commercial Arbitrated Law," 37 Y.L.J.
595. That distinction thus appears only in American statutes.
Many have tried to give the impression that our modern arbi-
tration acts are copies of the English Law. In truth they
differ in almost every important detail. The British law de-
votes itself more to providing an adequate procedure for arbi-
tration and less to rigid enforcement than do our American
Acts. The enforcement of arbitration agreements is entirely
discretionary with the courts of England. Bristol Corp. v. John
Aird & Co. [1913] App. Cas. 241, 257; Metropolitan Tunnel
and Public Works, Ltd. v. London Electric Ry., [ 1926] Ch.
371, 388-39o. Further their act makes no provision for com-
pelling arbitration by direct court order. Philip G. Phillips,
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Thus with the establishment of the American court system
the theory of "ousting the courts of jurisdiction" was firmly
imbedded in the law and uniformly followed as to contracts
concerning future disputes. Mecham v. Jameston, supra5
Blodgett Co. v. Bebe Co., suprai Henry v. Leheigh Valley Coal
Co., supra; U. S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Petroleum Co., 222
Fed. ioo6 (1915); Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264
U. S. 109, 120, 44 Sup. Ct. 274 (1923); Conner v. Drake,
I Ohio St. 1'66, 168 (853). Other cases place such holding
on "public policy" which seems to be an outgrowth of the same
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doctrine: Stephenson v. Poscataqua F. & M. Ins. Co., 54 Me.
55 (1866); Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377 (1868).
Arbitration agreements concerning present disputes were
under the common law revocable up to the time of the award:
Butler v. Greene, 49 Neb. 280, 68 N.W. 496 (1896); Sart-
well v. Soules, 72 Va. 270, 48 At. i I, 8 2 Am. St. Rep. 943
(i90oo); Decham Iron Works v. Bank of Comarce and Trust
Co., 214 U. S. 515, 29 Sup. Ct. 697, 53 L. Ed. io64 (1909);
Mead v. Owens, 83 Vt. 132, 74 Ad. io58 (1913). Statutes in
many states, however, have made irrevocable a contract for
arbitration entered into as to a present existing dispute: White
Eagle Laundry Co. v. Slawek, 296 Ill. 240, 129 N.E. 753
(1920)i Cocalis v. Nazlides, 3q8 Ill. 152, 139 N.E. 95
(1923); State ex rel School District v. Andree, 2 16 Mo. 617,
116 S.W. 56I (1919). "Before the enactment of the arbitra-
tion act the court could not specifically enforce an agreement to
arbitrate but left the parties entirely to their remedies at law
for a breach of a contract, and the effect of a statute making the
agreement irrevocable is merely to provide for the specific per-
formance of the contract and the statute violates no constitu-
tional rights" White Eagle Laundry Co. v. Slamek, supra. No
claim was made that such contracts outsed the jurisdiction of the
courts, such a rule being applied only to contracts concerning
future disputes.
This was about the situation in Ohio up until the passage of
the present act. G. C. 12148, 29 O.L. 264, repealed in 114
0. L. 137, which provided, "Except when the possession or
title of real property may come into question all persons who
have a controversy may submit it to arbitration or umpirage of
any person or persons to be mutually agreed upon by the parties
and to make such submission a rule of any court of record in
the state." The former Ohio Act is no great departure from
the common law rule but it certainly is not as is stated in 4
UNIV. CINN. L. REv. 61 (193o) an affirmation of the common
law rule.
The next logical step would be to provide that the courts
could specifically enforce contracts to arbitrate future disputes.
As previously seen such has been allowed in England since
1889. The Arbitration Act of 1889, 52 & 53 Vict. C. 49
(1889). And as seen, there the courts have the discretion to
enforce or not to enforce specifically the arbitration agreement.
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The Ohio Arbitration Act succeeded G. C. 12148. Its most
important provision is contained in section i. "A provision in
any written contract-to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or out of the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or any agreement in
writing between two or more persons to submit to arbitration
any controversy existing between them at the time of the agree-
ment to arbitrate, shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the re-
vocation of any contract." Other sections provide for the ap-
pointment by the court or arbitrators in case of refusal of one
party to so appoint, for the compelling of witnesses, taking of
oaths, punishment by contempt for refusal to testify, etc. Sec-
tion 9 provides for a confirmation action in the courts within one
year and section 12 provides that upon such confirmation the
court must enter judgment in conformity therewith.
Thus it is seen that the legislature took the full step, not
providing as in England that the courts could specifically en-
force such contracts but providing that the courts shall enforce
them, leaving no discretion at all in the matter.
Is such a statute constitutional? It has been held so in other
states, including New York. In fact the Ohio Act is taken
from the New York Act. Similar statutes have been passed in
Massachusetts in 1925, Hawaii 1925, California 1927, Penn-
sylvania 1927, Louisiana 1928, Arizona 1929, Connecticut
1929, New Hampshire 1929, Rhode Island 1929, New Jersey
1923, Oregon 1929, Wisconsin 1931, and Federal 1925. The
New York Act was passed in 192o.
The constitutionality of the New York law was raised and
determined in 1921 in the notable case of Berkovitz v. Asbid
and Houlberg 23o N. Y. 261, 13o N. E. 288 (1921).
The Ohio situation is peculiar, however, because of the
presence of Art. I, Sec. 16 of the Ohio Constitution. The ef-
fect of this section we shall discuss later. But in the absence of
Art. i, Sec. 16 the reasoning of the Berkovitz case, if followad,
would be as applicable to Ohio as to New York.
The New York act was assailed in the Berkovitz case on the
grounds: (i) that it violated the right of trial by jury given by
Art. I, Sec. 2 of the New York Constitution; (2) that contracts
to arbitrate future disputes "ousted the jurisdiction of the
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courts"; (3) that such contracts were against public policy;
and (4) that the obligation of contracts was impaired.
The New York Court of Appeals speaking through Judge
Cardozo answers each of these contentions. (i) The right
of trial by jury is one that may be waived and is waived
by the consent to arbitrate. And such consent is found ever
though the agreement to arbitrate came before the passage of
the statute. "A consent none the less, it was, however deficient
may once have been the remedy to enforce it. Those who gave
it, did so in view of the possibility that a better remedy might
come. They took the chances of the future." (2) The Court
says that it does not "oust the jurisdiction of the courts" but
simply introduces a new plea. Judge Cardozo says at page 274
'Tower, though not transferred, is still not to be withdrawn, if
fundamental and inherent in the conception of a court with gen-
eral jurisdiction in equity and law. Changes, we may assume,
will be condemned if subversive of historical traditions of dig-
nity and power. Such is not the change effected by this statute.
The Supreme Court does not lose a power inherent in its very
being when it loses power to give aid in the repudiation of a
contract, concluded without fraud or error, whereby differences
are to be settled without resort to litigation." In other words
the court feels that this is merely a matter of remedy which can
be dealt with by the legislature, the law which the courts en-
force not being a fixed and unchangeable thing. (3) Public
policy is declared by the legislature and it had by statute de-
clared the public policy inapplicable here. "In fact even
before the statute such a contract was not illegal and a nullity.
Public policy was thought to forbid that the promise be specif-
ically enforced. Public policy did not forbid an award of dam-
ages if it were broken." (4) Here the opinion contents itself
with merely asserting as a self evident fact that "The obligation
of contracts is strengthened, not impaired." Since there is no
doubt but that the parties had contracted and that to specifically
enforce a contract does not impair the obligation of contracts
this assertion cannot be questioned.
The principal of revocation, an agency principal, on which
all these cases are based, at least historically, was not mentioned.
This, however, can raise no new objection to the Ohio Act since
the law of agency can surely be changed by statute to make such
power irrevocable.
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The constitutionality of the New York statute as regards
the Federal Constitution was later upheld in Red Cross Line v.
Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U. S. 109, 44 Sup. Ct. 274 (1923).
Prior to this statute an agreement to arbitrate was legal in New
York and damages were revoverable for a breach thereof: Hag-
gart v. Morgan, 5 N. Y. 422, 55 Am. Dec. 350 (85I). But
specific performance of this promise could not be enforced and
the promise could not be pleaded in bar to an action and it could
not support a motion to stay. Finucane Co. v. Board of Educa-
tion, 19o N. Y. 76, 82 N. E. 737 (1908)- "The net effect of
the whole thing, including the confirmation is a suit for the
specific performance of the contract to arbitrate": Matter of
Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N. Y. 284, 169
N. E. 386 (1929).
Another line of attack on the Ohio Act is, that it discrimin-
ates unjustly in that it excludes in G.C. 12148-1, subsection a
and b, contracts of labor or relating to employment. But this
has been held reasonable discrimination and constitutional.
Many laws are not of universal application. Pacific Indemnity
Co. v. Insurance Co. of NorthAmerica, 25 F. (2d) 930 (1928).
The case of Baltimore and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Stankard, 56
Ohio St. 224, 46 N.E. 577, 49 L.R. 381 (1897) seems to
stand in the way of the Ohio Act. The syllabus of that case
reads: "One of the rules of the relief department of a railroad
company, provided that all the claims of beneficiaries should be
submitted to the determination of the superintendent whose
decision should be final and conclusive, unless appealed to the
advisory committee and in case of such appeal, the decision of
the committee should be final and conclusive upon all parties
without exception or appeal: Held, that after the rejection of a
valid claim by the advisory committee, the beneficiary could
maintain an a,.L;ua in the court for the recovery of money due
thereon, and that such rule is not a bar to the action."
On page 231 is the significant language, "A long line of
decisions hold that parties cannot by contract take away the
jurisdiction of the courts in such cases and the attempt to do so
is void. While courts usually base their decisions upon the
ground that parties cannot by contract in advance oust the
courts of jurisdiction of actions, a more satisfactory ground is,
that under our constitution all courts are open, and every per-
son for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or repu-
88 LAW JOURNAL
tation shall have his remedy by due course of law. Art i, Sec.
16. Courts are created by virtue of the constitution and inhere
in our body politic as a necessary part of our system of govern-
ment, and it is not competent for anyone by contract or other-
wise to deprive himself of their protection. The right to ap-
peal to the courts for the redress of wrongs, is one of those
rights which is in its nature under our constitution inalienable
and cannot be thrown off or bargained away." The court in
this case admits that parties can contract to leave all questions
of fact which arise in a future dispute to arbitrators, "qeaving
the question of law to be settled by the courts upon proper pro-
ceedings. The ultimate question to be determined-the lia-
bility or non-liability of the parties must be left to the courts."
The Stankard case was cited with approval in Meyers v.
Jenkins, Adm'r., 63 Ohio St. 101, 57 N.E. lO89, 8I Am. St.
Rep. 613 (19oo). The plaintiff here was a member of the
Independent Order of Odd Fellows. Plaintiff sued for money
which he claimed was due on a sick benefit policy. The defend-
ant lodge denied the jurisdiction of the court in that plaintiff on
application for membership had signed an agreement obligating
himself to seek his remedy -for all rights or account of such
membership or connection therewithin the tribunals of the order
only, without resulting for the enforcement in any court or for
any purpose to the civil courts. The court here held for the
defendant on the ground that the plaintiff was estopped since,
after his cause of action arose, he had submitted to the tribunals
of the lodge and that he had a right in such tribunals to appeal
but had not done so.
At page I2o the court says by way of dicta, "After a right
has accrued or an obligation has been incurred, a party may
waive his rights and refuse and neglect to enforce them but he
may not by contract in advance renounce his rights to appeal to
the courts for the redress of wrongs. The whole state has an
interest in all its inhabitants and it is to its interest that the
rights of all should be protected and enforced according to the
course of jurisprudence it has providedi and for that reason
its courts are always open for the redress of wrongs."
The above two cases were cited as the weight of authority
in a note in 51 A.L.R. at page 1420. It must be noted of
course that they were not decided under a statute making future
disputes irrevocable as does the present Ohio Arbitration Act.
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A contract to submit future disputes to arbitration "is a
mere executory agreement and does not furnish a bar to an
action on the contract. Tilden v. Barnard, 12 O.C.C. (N.S.)
193, 3I O.C.C. 255 (i9io). The defense of errors in law was
not open to a party where in the case of an existing dispute
arbitrators were appointed and an award made, the parties hav-
ing agreed that the award should be final and conclusive: Phel-
ger v. Renner, 13 Ohio App. 96, 32 O.C.C. (N.S.) 329 (1920)
Ormsby v. Bakewell, 7 Ohio 98 (i935). But note that these
cases were where the parties had agreed as to an existing dis-
pute. Courts of equity will not grant specific performance of an
agreement to submit to arbitration. Conner v. Drake, i Ohio
St. i66 (1853) ; Shafer v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distribut-
ing Corp., 36 Ohio App. 31, 172 N.E. 689 (i93i). But these
cases too were before the statute.
In Paddock Hodge Co. v. Grain Dealers National Associa-
tion et al., 18 Ohio App. 66, 19 O.L.R. 396 (1921), the court
refused to enjoin defendant Grain Dealer Association from
ousting the plaintiff from the association or refusing to abide
by an arbitration, an arbitration however agreed to after dispute
arose. So this case on its facts too gives little assistance in our
problem here. There are dicta in the case however to the effect
that the Grain Association could adopt rules and by-laws pro-
viding for the arbitration of all matters of difference pertaining
to the grain business that might arise between its members, and
that the Grain Association could oust from the organization any
member who refused to so arbitrate and could make such fact
known publicly. This case therefor goes even further than
any New York case decided before the present statute.
Cases holding that a party could revoke at any time a con-
tract to arbitrate future disputes and that such contracts ousted
the "jurisdiction of the courts" were not peculiar to this state.
All states before their present "future disputes" statutes held
exactly the same way. An outstanding case is Meacham v.
Pameston, Franklin and Clerefield Ry. Co. Supra. In fact the
opinion was written by Judge Cardozo, who also wrote the
opinion of the Berkovitz case, supra, which upheld the New
York Arbitration Act of 192o. The syllabus reads, "A pro-
vision in a contract for the construction of a railroad conferring
upon the chief engineer of a railroad company power to decide
all matters in dispute arising or growing out of the contract and
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by which each party waives all right of action, suit, or suits or
other remedy in law or otherwise under this contract or arising
out of the same, to enforce any claim except as the same shall
be determined by the arbitrator" is open to the objection that
it is an independent covenant or agreement to provide for the
adjustment and settlement of all disputes and all differences
by arbitration to the exclusion of the courts, and is invalid."
Other cases so holding are: Niagra Fire Insurance Co. v. Bish-
OP, 154 Ill. 9, 39 N.E. iio2 (884); United States Asphalt
Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., Ltd., 222 Fed.
ioo6 (1915)5 Stephenson v. Poscataqua F. & M. Ins. Co.,
54 Me. 55 (1866); and Hurst v. Litczfield, 39 N. Y. 377
(1868).
Since therefore the Standard and the Meyers cases, supra,
were decided in the absence of such a statute as now exists there
is nothing conclusive about their holdings, as such, but the lan-
guage to the effect that Art. i, Sec. 16 stands in the way is more
important. Is Art. i, Sec. i6 a bar to the constitutionality of
the Ohio Arbitration Act? If not we think that there is no
doubt of its constitutionality. What does Art. i, Sec. 16
mean? Cases invoking it are very few and except for the
Stankard and Meyers cases not at all in point. And unless these
cases are conclusive of the issue the question must be examined
as of first impression.
The Berkovitz case, supra, deciding that the New York
Act was constitutional discussed the right of the Courts that they
should not be ousted of jurisdiction. The Ohio Constitution
speaks of the right of "every person" that the courts would be
open. It will not answer the question to say that the Ohio pro-
vision is a part of the Ohio Constitution and that the question of
"ousting the courts of jurisdiction" is not a constitutional pro-
vision. For the right of the courts not to be ousted of juris-
diction is implied from the constitutional creation of the courts
themselves. The New York courts did not claim that the courts
could by legislative enactment be ousted of jurisdiction but only
that the particular provision had not ousted them of jurisdic-
tion, that it was merely the interposition of a plea.
Is there here any difference in the constitutional right of
the courts and the constitutional right of a person? We can see
none. To say that the courts are not "ousted of jurisdiction"
is to say that they still have jurisdiction. To say that the courts
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still have jurisdiction is to say that the courts are still open.
And if the courts are still open a party has not been deprived of
any constitutional right and the Ohio Arbitration Act is con-
stitutional.
It might be claimed that, although the above reasoning
would seem to follow, it is defective in that the court mighi
say that, although looking at the situation from the viewpoint
of the courts, the courts have not been ousted of jurisdiction,
yet, looking from the viewpoint of the parties, the courts are
not, within the meaning of the constitution, "open." If such
reasoning were followed it would seem that the Ohio Act
would of necessity be held unconstitutional. After holding that
the courts are not "open" the only possible aventue to holding
the Ohio Act constitutional would be to hold this constitutional
right of a person alienable. But this right has been declared
inalienable in the Stankard case, supra, and we see no reason
why the courts should reverse its decision on this point. A
court would not indulge in the fine distinction above and then
held the right alienable.
But we maintain that the court will not look with any more
favor to the rights of persons than to the rights of the courts.
As it follows from the constitutional creation of a judiciary that
the courts have a constitutional right not to be ousted of juris-
diction so it follows that a perosn has by such creation a consti-
tutional right that the courts should be open. It co-exists with
the before mentioned right of the courts and the very fact that
Judge Cardozo does not mention it shows that it was not re-
garded as being on a higher plane than the right of the courts
there discussed. Surely the courts are not more jealous of the
rights of an individual than they are of the rights of the public
at large which is termed the right of the courts.
It seems, therefore, that the Ohio courts can possibly but
not too logically distinguish the Ohio situation from the one
existing in New York and the only question is whether the Ohio
courts will choose to follow the reasoning of the Berkovittz case
and decree specific performance which all courts refused before
the passage of "future disputes" statutes "because the court
will refuse to interfere in any case where, if it were to do so,
one of the parties might nullify its action through the exercise
of a descretion (the right to revoke) which the contract on the
law invests him with" Cooley, J. in Rust v. Conrad, 47 Mich.
449, 455, i N.W. 265, 267 (882).
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No cases involving the Ohio Act have been found but there
is nothing unusual in that fact in view of the relatively recent
passage of the act. The same situation existed in New York
and other states until the Bar became more familiar with its
provisions. Then many cases arose all holding that the award
not reversable for errors of fact or law on the point of the ar-
bitration and that the jurisdiction of the courts was not ousted.
S toh & Co. v. Bayer Oil Co. 198 App. Div. 881, 191 N.Y.S.
290 (1922); Everett v. Brown, 120 Misc. 349, 198 N.Y.S.
462 (I923); Liggett v. Jarrington Bldg Co., 114 Conn. 425,
158 Atl. 617 (1932); Anderson Trading Co. v. Brimberg, 119
Misc. 784 (1922); Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co.,
252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929).
The application of the New York act, which could be the
same as under the Ohio act is discussed by Osmond K. Fraenkel
in 32 COL. L.R. 623. The whole field of arbitration is excel-
lently reviewed in the UNIv. OF PA. L. REv. for December,
1934, the entire issue being devoted to that subject. Other
good discussions are contained in 34 YALE L. J. 48o 37 YALE
L. J. 5955 N. Y. L. JouR. for Jan. 14, 1925 and Dec. 17, 1925
and 13 A. B. A. JOUR. 667. An excellent book on the subject
is COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW by H. Cohen.
